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A LITIGATOR'S VIEW OF DISCOVERY AND PROOF
IN POLICE MISCONDUCT POLICY AND
PRACTICE CASES
G. Flint Taylor*
Since the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape' in 1961, police
misconduct litigators have sought to hold municipalities liable for con-
stitutional violations committed by their employees under color of
law. The major reason to establish municipal liability was elemen-
tary-to reach a deep pocket in circumstances where the municipality
did not willingly indemnify its police employees. The Monroe Court
rejected vicarious municipal liability under § 1983,2 but in Monell v.
Department of Social Services of New York,3 the Court established di-
rect municipal liability but only where a policy, practice, or custom
caused the constitutional violation at issue.4 Monell and subsequent
Supreme Court cases established that this policy, practice, or custom
could either be written, de facto, or established by the single act of a
municipal official if that official was, as a matter of state law, the final
policymaker for the act in question.5 Otherwise, a single unconstitu-
tional act, no matter how egregious, will not, standing alone, establish
a sufficient policy, practice, or custom for purposes of municipal liabil-
ity under § 1983.6
While early Supreme Court decisions construing Monell articulated
only two required elements for establishing Monell liability (i.e., a mu-
* Mr. Taylor, a graduate of Brown University and Northwestern Law School, is a longtime
National Lawyers Guild member and a founding partner of the People's Law Office in Chicago,
an office which has been dedicated to litigating civil rights, police voilence, and government
misconduct cases for almost thirty years. Among the landmark cases that Mr. Taylor has liti-
gated are the Fred Hampton Black Panther case, the Greensboro, North Carolina case against
the Ku Klux Klan and Nazis, and, most recently, a series of cases arising from police torture by
Chicago police officials. Mr. Taylor has successfully argued the case of Cheavinger v. Saxner and
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons before the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Taylor is also a founding
editor of the Police Misconduct and Civil Rights Law Report.
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
3. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 690-91, 694; see McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784-86 (1997); Praprotnik
v. City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. 112, 122-25 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-
84 (1986).
6. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
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nicipal policy, practice, or custom, which caused the constitutional vio-
lation),7 the Court later added a third element-deliberate
indifference of the municipality and its relevant policymakers-at
least in circumstances where the policy or practice was a facially con-
stitutional policy of acquiescence.8 This deliberate indifference is ob-
jective in nature and requires that the relevant policymakers have
constructive notice, in contrast to the higher and subjective deliberate
indifference standard which the Court has required in Eighth Amend-
ment prison cases.9 Additionally, the Court has rejected the "height-
ened pleading" standard previously required by many courts in
Monell cases and instead requires only notice pleadings under Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,10 adopting the Ninth Circuit's
view that the plaintiff need only make "a bare allegation that the indi-
vidual officer's conduct conformed to official policy, custom or prac-
tice" in order to make out a well-pleaded Monell claim.1" The Court
has also held that a municipality may not assert a qualified immunity
defense12 and that the municipality cannot be held liable for punitive
damages.1 3
WHY BRING MONELL CLAIMS IN POLICE CASES?
In addition to reaching the municipal deep pocket, there are addi-
tional reasons to bring a Monell claim in a § 1983 police case. A Mo-
nell claim gives plaintiffs' lawyers in serious brutality cases a direct
path to the municipality, which is often important for purposes of dis-
covery, settlement, trial, and collection. In cases where the accused
official has committed a constitutional violation but is immune from
suit, a Moneil claim against the municipality may be the only actiona-
ble claim. Such claims also facilitate the development of systemic evi-
dence of deliberate indifference to police brutality, as well as
information concerning "repeater" officers, the functioning of the po-
lice disciplinary and counseling system, and the attitudes of police offi-
7. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
8. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840-41 (1994).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
11. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics, Intelligence, and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993).
12. Owen, 445 U.S. at 622.
13. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). For an in depth discussion of
Supreme Court and lower court decisions on the issue of municipal liability, see Karen M. Blum,
From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP.
L.Q. 409 (1978); G. Flint Taylor, Municipal Liability Litigation in Police Misconduct Cases From
Monroe to Praprotnik and Beyond, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 447 (1988); and MICHAEL AVERY ET AL.,
POLICE MISCONDUCr LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 3:4-3:5 (1996).
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cials towards important police disciplinary issues. If appropriate
protective orders are obtained, this information can be shared by law-
yers in their various cases against police abusers, obviating the need
for extensive discovery in each case, and helping each lawyer to prop-
erly evaluate his or her case for settlement and trial. A Monell claim
also permits wider discovery, broadens the scope of admissibility at
trial, facilitates holding supervisory and command officials responsi-
ble, and allows plaintiffs' litigators to properly apportion the blame
between the individual officers and the municipality. In some in-
stances, aggressive discovery and litigation of such claims can also pos-
itively affect pertinent police policies and practices, as well as increase
the value of the case for settlement or at trial.
Conversely, however, Monell claims can greatly increase the costs
of litigation, the attorney time expended, the effort of the opposition,
and the length and complexity of the trial. Defense tactics, such as
seeking bifurcation of the Monell claims from the underlying cause of
action, contesting discovery, and otherwise delaying resolution of the
case, can also be frustrating and render Monell claims counterproduc-
tive. Moreover, many trial judges tend to look on such claims with
disfavor, and deliberate indifference and other related issues can pres-
ent formidable legal obstacles.
In sum, Monell claims, while an important litigational tool, should
only be utilized after careful consideration of all the pertinent factors
relevant to the particular case in question, including: (1) the serious-
ness and complexity of the underlying claim; (2) the underlying ques-
tions of immunity; (3) the public importance of the issues raised; (4)
the disciplinary background of the accused officers; (5) the applicable
indemnification statutes and policies; (6) whether the municipality has
conceded that the officer was acting in the scope of his employment;
(7) the attitudes of the trial judge to whom the case is assigned; (8) the
resources available to pursue the claim; (9) the nature of the policy
and practice; and (10) the strength of the claim-both with regard to
the policy and practice itself, and its causal relationship to the underly-
ing misconduct.
COMMON TYPES OF MONELL CLAIMS IN POLICE
MISCONDucT CASES
There are several different types of policy and practice claims which
typically arise in § 1983 police misconduct cases. First, there are
claims which are premised on an affirmative pattern of misconduct
and/or municipal deliberate indifference to it. Examples include a
pattern of police torture of suspects in custody, planting of evidence,
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or domestic violence by police officers.14 A second type of claim
arises when the underlying misconduct arises directly from the prac-
tice itself, such as when a claim of malicious prosecution and suppres-
sion of exculpatory evidence arises from a police practice of
maintaining secret "street files" in order to suppress exculpatory in-
formation from criminal defendants. 15 A third type of claim arises
when the municipality's final decisionmaker is a participant in the un-
derlying misconduct itself.16 Finally, there is the Moneil claim that
arises from the municipality's systemic failure to adequately hire,
train, supervise, discipline, monitor, counsel, or otherwise control its
officers. 17 Since these "failure to" claims are the most commonly em-
ployed Moneil claims in police misconduct cases and since failure to
discipline is so often the linchpin of such claims, we will examine in
detail discovery and proof in failure to discipline cases.
DISCOVERY AND PROOF IN MONELL FAILURE TO DISCIPLINE CASES
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, City of Canton v. Harris18 and
Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown,19 have
the most direct application to Monell failure to discipline cases. In
Canton, the plaintiff alleged a failure to properly train police officers,
and the Court held that such a facially unconstitutional policy could
be sustained only if the failure "amounts to deliberate indifference to
the rights of persons with whom the police come in contact" and evi-
dences "a 'deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . from
various alternatives' by City policy makers. ' 20 The "need for more or
different training must be so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to
result in the violation of constitutional rights that the policy makers of
the City can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent
to the need."' 21 Moreover, the Court held that the "alleged deficiency
in the training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury,"
and posited a test in aid of that determination:
Would the injury have been avoided had the employee been trained
under a program that was not deficient in the identified respect?
14. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993); Czajkowski v. City of
Chicago, 810 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. I11. 1992).
15. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
16. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
17. See, e.g., Sledd v. Lindsay, 102 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1996); McLin v. City of Chicago, 742 F.
Supp. 994 (N.D. I11. 1990); Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. I11. 1982).
18. 489 U.S. 378 (1988).
19. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
20. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388-89.
21. Id. at 390.
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Predicting how a hypothetically well-trained officer would have ac-
ted under the circumstances may not be an easy task for the
factfinder, particularly since matters of judgment may be involved,
and since officers who are well-trained are not free from error and
perhaps might react very much like the enthroned officer in similar
circumstances. But the judge and jury, doing their respective jobs,
will be adequate to the task.22
In Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, the
plaintiff obtained a Monell verdict against Bryan County on her exces-
sive force claim. This verdict was premised on the Sheriff's prior deci-
sion to hire the officer who committed the excessive force, despite a
questionable history which included a misdemeanor conviction for as-
sault.2 3 The Supreme Court, "without deciding whether proof of a
single instance of inadequate screening could ever trigger municipal
liability," and applying "rigorous standards of culpability and causa-
tion" to determine whether the plaintiff had shown the requisite delib-
erate indifference as set forth in Canton, reversed the verdict, holding
that the County was "not liable for Sheriff Moore's isolated decision
to hire [Officer] Burns without adequate screening, because respon-
dent has not demonstrated that his decision reflected a conscious dis-
regard for a high risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation
of respondent's federally protected right."'2 4
The Canton and Brown decisions have obvious relevance to the
closely related Monell failure to discipline claims, which also continue
to be viable under these restrictive holdings. Deliberate indifference
is also the appropriate standard in discipline cases, with a similar stan-
dard of causation required. Moreover, it seems apparent that the dis-
ciplinary inadequacies need be equally obvious and the harm equally
likely to result as in training cases for there to be deliberate indiffer-
ence by the municipality's policymakers. With these decisions in
mind, we now turn to the specifics of pleading, discovering, and prov-
ing a Monell failure to discipline case.
In keeping with the rationale of these decisions, the major goal of
plaintiffs' lawyers in proving a failure to discipline case is to show that
the police disciplinary process, both formal and informal, is woefully
inadequate, with the result being that the department fails to disci-
pline officers, as a matter of policy and practice, in the great majority
of meritorious police abuse cases that are brought to its attention. Af-
ter this is shown, it is appropriate to argue, under Canton, that this
general failure to discipline was a direct cause of the brutality that is
22. Id. at 391.
23. Brown, 520 U.S. at 401.
24. Id. at 415-16.
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the subject of the particular case at bar because the police violator was
aware that he was effectively immunized from disciplinary action by
this disciplinary policy, making the eventuality of the unconstitutional
violation sufficiently obvious to the municipality to sustain liability
under Canton and Brown. The policy and practice of failure to disci-
pline operates hand in hand with the police "code of silence," a closely
related practice and custom that is manifest in all police departments.
This code of silence further aids the offending officer in escaping disci-
plinary reproach. Additionally, another important, although not in-
dispensable, element of the causation equation is the existence of
prior complaints of brutality and misconduct against the defendant vi-
olator. "Not sustained" findings in these cases further establish the
police defendant's expectation of immunity from punishment when he
brutalizes the plaintiff, and demonstrate some degree of prior notice
to the municipality. "Sustained" findings-a much more unlikely cir-
cumstance-operate as stronger evidence of notice and may also be
admissible against the defendant police officer under Rules 404(b) or
608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 25
The specifics of proof in discipline cases often require a painstaking
gathering and analysis of much detailed evidence concerning the disci-
plinary process over a period of several years before and after the
incident in question. Fortunately, in many jurisdictions much of this
work has already been done in prior cases, so counsel must only locate
and update already developed evidence. Often, a police expert, either
a sympathetic local (ex) police official, or one who specializes in police
misconduct cases, may be required to help interpret and evaluate the
evidence, both for plaintiff's counsel, and, later, for the jury.
Much of this evidence can be found in the official files, reports, and
minutes kept by the police disciplinary agency, the police board, or
the office of the police superintendent; in audits or other periodic re-
views done by the department or outside agencies; in police general
orders and regulations; in the local ordinances that often create and
regulate the disciplinary agencies; and in the records of public hear-
ings held to investigate the disciplinary system after particularly egre-
gious acts of unpunished brutality cause widespread community
outrage. Additionally, under pressure due to community outrage,
high level police personnel sometimes make relevant admissions to
the media or at public hearings. The Special Litigation Unit of the
Department of Justice has recently implemented consent decrees
against police departments in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Steuben-
25. FED. R. EviD. 404(b), 608(b).
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ville, Ohio which establish meaningful reforms of the police discipli-
nary systems, as well as the related areas of police monitoring,
training, supervision, and record keeping, which can serve as impor-
tant tools in setting standards of competence and identifying specific
systemic problems.26 Additionally, numerous agencies and founda-
tions, including the Police Foundation, the International Association
for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, the Police Practices Pro-
ject of the San Francisco ACLU, the National Lawyers Guild, the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the Medgar Evers
Center for Social Justice, the International Association of the Chiefs
of Police, and private law firms are also sources of valuable informa-
tion. Recent studies and reports on police abuse by human rights or-
ganizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
are also valuable resources. 27
After this evidence is gathered and analyzed, depositions of the po-
lice superintendent, the director of the police disciplinary agency, a
sympathetic police official or police board member, the investigator
who was assigned to your client's case, the head of the department's
"early warning" and counseling program, and the police violators and
their supervisors, should yield further relevant evidence-a combina-
tion of admissions, contradictions, unlikely ignorance, and implausible
denials.
THE DISCIPLINARY AGENCY
The composition, procedures, and performance of the police disci-
plinary agency are vital components of the proof itself. First, statistics
concerning the number of citizens' complaints must be received and
processed, and the imposition of police discipline must be obtained
and evaluated. Most police disciplinary agencies have several recom-
mended findings that include the categories of "sustained" and "not
sustained." While the "sustained" category normally carries with it a
recommendation for some form of discipline, the ubiquitous "not sus-
tained" category is most often defined as "not enough evidence to
either prove or disprove the charges" and results in no discipline to
the officer. Most urban police disciplinary agencies "sustain" a very
26. See, e.g., Consent Decree of Apr. 16, 1997, United States v. City of Pittsburgh (No. 97-
0354) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
27. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, POLICE BRUTALITY
AND EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (1996); HUMAN RIGHTS




small percentage of the citizens' complaints that they investigate,
while their "not sustained" rates are often fifty to sixty-five percent.
There are several ways to present this proof in order to substantiate
the failure to discipline claim. The "sustained" rate can be compared
to success rates in the adjudication of similar claims in other forums
(for example, § 1983 police brutality cases, criminal prosecutions in
felony cases, internal police adjudication of non-civilian complaints of
police misconduct, and "sustained" rates in other jurisdictions) to
show how disproportionately low the disciplinary "sustained" rate is.
Selected cases of clear merit where the officer was absolved by the
disciplinary process can be presented, with emphasis on those in which
the officer was subsequently convicted of criminal misconduct, found
liable in a civil trial, or subjected to a substantial civil settlement. The
fact that disciplinary proceedings against the officer were not re-
opened and discipline imposed even after such an unfavorable resolu-
tion should also be shown.
Additionally, by the department's own definition, the "not sus-
tained" rate is in reality a non-finding, and the Justice Department has
recognized this problem in its consent decrees by reclassifying all such
cases as "not resolved." The disciplinary agency, the superintendent,
or an investigator will often admit that "one on one" cases (i.e., victim
vs. the police officer with no independent witnesses) are most always
classified as "not sustained." The clearly meritorious cases that go
into this category, together with the admissions of the defendants, and
the sheer volume of "not sustained" findings, provide additional evi-
dence in support of a plaintiff's failure to discipline claim. The testi-
mony of a police expert is often extremely important in addressing
this question, as the expert can examine a large sample of "not sus-
tained" investigations which might not be otherwise admissible, and
not only offer opinions about the inadequacy of those investigations,
but also form an opinion as to how many of those cases should have
been sustained pursuant to Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 28
So, even if the "sustained" rate is relatively respectable, there may
still be a viable disciplinary claim, if the "not sustained" rate is dispro-
portionately high. Another circumstance where a relatively high "sus-
tained" rate may not preclude a disciplinary claim is where the
complaints received and processed by the department or the agency
are disproportionately low in comparison to the size of the municipal-
ity and the department and do not reflect the known level of brutality
28. FED. R. EviD. 703.
[Vol. 48:747
DISCOVERY AND PROOF UNDER MONELL
in the community. While the department would no doubt argue that
this is due to the low level of brutality, a more plausible explanation,
in light of the known level of brutality, would be that the public has
little or no confidence in the agency for various reasons, such as it is
run and staffed by police rather than civilians, it often loses complaints
or refuses to log or investigate them. In such circumstances, the "sus-
tained" statistics can be overcome by proof of the structure, opera-
tion, and public image of the disciplinary agency in question.
Often, the "sustained" rates released by the department, when fur-
ther analyzed and broken down, prove to be inflated. In many cases,
there are multiple allegations that include a charge of excessive force
together with various lesser charges, while on other occasions, there is
no excessive force alleged at all. Further examination and breakdown
of the "sustained" complaints in this way may establish that non-ex-
cessive force allegations are "sustained" with greater relative fre-
quency than excessive force allegations. Additionally, cases that are
sustained by the disciplinary agency are reviewed at various levels,
and the finding is sometimes changed by the police superintendent or
the police board. The "sustained" rates should also be examined to
determine if Black victims or Black officers are treated less favorably
than white ones, as should the actual punishment meted out in those
"sustained" cases that withstand review. Often, the punishment is dis-
proportionately minor for the offense-an admonishment, a repri-
mand, an "instruction," or a short suspension. The degree of
punishment can also be compared with that which is meted out in
cases where the allegation is not based on abuse of a citizen (e.g., in-
subordination), as the punishment in these less serious cases will often
be greater than in a serious brutality case.
PROCEDURAL AND FUNCTIONAL INADEQUACIES OF THE
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
Another major area of proof in Monell failure to discipline cases is
the procedural and functional inadequacies of the disciplinary system
itself.29 A very important component of this proof is the connection
of the disciplinary agency to the police department. While civilian re-
view boards and civilian investigative staffs have not proven to be the
panacea that they were once thought to be, this is largely because they
are, in most instances, ultimately controlled by the police department,
inadequately staffed and funded, and constrained from aggressively
investigating and disciplining police who violate citizens' rights.
29. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
1999]
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Where citizens' complaints are investigated by the department's Inter-
nal Affairs Division and its staff of police officers, police connection
and control is easily shown. However, where there is the appearance
of civilian review, the proof is more extensive and sophisticated.
Although the director may be a civilian, chosen by the mayor, the
agency may have been created by police order, and that order may
classify the director as a member of the police superintendent's staff
or place him in the police chain of command. The agency's "sus-
tained" findings and disciplinary sanctions are most likely mere rec-
ommendations that are subject to review and change by police
command personnel, the superintendent, and the police board. The
department may have the power to remove selected complaints from
the agency's jurisdiction altogether and deal with them internally,
either by the Internal Affairs Division, which is staffed by police of-
ficers, or by police supervisors at the stationhouse level without exter-
nal review. Many of the investigators, while not currently police
officers, may be former city or police employees, police candidates
awaiting results of the police examination, persons who were spon-
sored by police or city officials, or persons who are otherwise con-
nected to law enforcement. Additionally, police may comprise part of
the investigatory or supervisory staff and complaints may be taken at
police headquarters or a police station. While the city may have a
civilian review board, it often has little or no power to effect police
discipline, as it may only receive the "sustained" cases that have sur-
vived the investigatory and police review stages.
The procedures and standards followed by the agency, the efficiency
and competence of the investigators, and investigations may also be
important components of the proof. The salaries paid may not be suf-
ficiently competitive to attract competent investigators and the staff
may not be properly educated, motivated, trained, or otherwise quali-
fied for the job, in addition to being predominately male and white.
The agency may be understaffed for the volume of work at hand, and
the resultant backloads may be a cause of shoddy, pro forma investi-
gations. The agency may not have subpoena power, and an examina-
tion of the statements taken may show a hostile or skeptical cross-
examination approach by investigators when questioning victims, and
a deferential, "once over lightly" approach when questioning police
perpetrators and accomplices. Sometimes, the accused officer is not
required to give a formal statement at all, but rather responds with a
brief report which contains little more than a bare denial. Basic items
of evidence such as police reports, lock-up records, medical records,
photographs, or police tapes may not be obtained or are subsequently
[Vol. 48:747
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"lost," and efforts to identify an officer unknown to the victim may be
cursory or non-existent.
Some agencies refuse to take anonymous complaints, to enter find-
ings where the perpetrator is unknown, to continue an investigation if
the complainant refuses to cooperate, or to investigate a pattern or
practice by a certain officer or officers within a stationhouse. At least
one department officially warns potential complainants and witnesses
that they will be prosecuted for filing a false report if its investigation
determines that the complaint was false, malicious, or filed in bad
faith. Investigators are often not permitted to know about any past
disciplinary history of the officers when investigating allegations
against them or to take the history into account when making their
determinations, even though "repeater beaters" with a particular mo-
dus operandi are an admitted problem in most departments and many
police officials will admit that such information would be significant in
determining the credibility of the complaint. Record-keeping is often
shoddy and archaic, with no cross-referencing of serious allegations
such as torture, abuse of women, or beatings with a flashlight, so pat-
terns cannot be identified and investigated. The backlog is often
large, complaints are lost, or victims and witnesses never contacted or
recontacted, and some cases remain open for years being buried in the
"not sustained" category. While the agency may profess to employ a
preponderance of the evidence standard, the investigators are often
unable to articulate or demonstrate any comprehension of the mean-
ing of the term. Furthermore, their recommendations in specific
cases, as well as the general "sustained" rates, demonstrate that, in
reality, many investigators follow a "reasonable doubt" standard. A
comparison of the investigative procedures within the department's
detective division with that of the disciplinary agency should also
demonstrate the manifest inadequacies in the latter's investigatory
techniques and performance.
THE POLICE CODE OF SILENCE
Another closely related area of importance is the police code of
silence. While the code can also be pleaded and proven as a separate
policy and practice, its relevance to a failure to discipline claim is also
significant. The code of silence is normally a department-wide prac-
tice that dictates that officers refuse to bear witness against a fellow
officer who is alleged to have violated a citizen's rights or otherwise
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
engaged in misconduct.30 An officer may implement the code by fail-
ing to report misconduct by a fellow officer, by falsely confirming the
charged officer's version of the events, by refusing to name other of-
ficers involved in the incident, or by claiming that their line of vision
was conveniently blocked, that they were otherwise occupied when
the incident happened, or that their memory has lapsed concerning
the incident. While police officers may feel that a fellow officer has
acted wrongfully, they fear that they will lose their job, or be subject
to ridicule, ostracization, and physical reprisals from their comrades if
the truth is told. When the perpetrator is white, and the fellow officer
is Black, the code is sometimes more reluctantly and less actively
honored. A related aspect of the code is police perjury in cases where
the victim is charged with an offense in order to cover-up police abuse
and misconduct, a practice which has been dubbed in several jurisdic-
tions as testifying by the offending officers themselves.
Obviously, the code of silence is a major hindrance to police disci-
plinary investigations, and some investigators and agency supervisors
will admit that the code exists and that it hampers their effectiveness.
These admissions are helpful, but feigned ignorance or denials by
these officials can be even more advantageous, if the code can be in-
dependently shown, because it underscores the agency's pro-police
bias and its complete failure to properly evaluate and adjudicate com-
plaints. Instead of educating and training investigators about the code
and expressly requiring its consideration when the statements of po-
lice witnesses are evaluated, most agencies ignore the code or deny its
existence and, as matter of practice, rule in favor of the police officer
in cases where it is a credibility contest between police and the victim.
The code itself can be shown in several ways. The director of the
agency, the police superintendent, or a police or agency supervisor
may concede its existence. A police audit or civilian review board
report may marshal statistics that show that officers hardly ever initi-
ate complaints or testify against fellow officers and conclude that this
is due to the code of silence. Examination of the officers in the case
may establish that they have never testified against another officer nor
are they aware of any other officer who has. This is especially effec-
tive where the officers so examined are detectives who have testified
at numerous motions to suppress where brutality or other unconstitu-
tional conduct has been alleged. In the unusual circumstance where
30. See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of
Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Apporach in Police Perjury, 59 U. Prr. L. REV. 233 (1998)
(discussing police codes of silence); G. Flint Taylor, Abusive Conduct and Torture Tactics of
Police, 3 POLICE MISCONDUCT & Civ. RTS. L. REP. 7 (1990) (same).
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an officer has come forward, subsequent treatment, both by fellow of-
ficers and the command structure, is often further proof of the code
because he or she will frequently be disciplined, transferred, or other-
wise harassed and ridiculed.
Often, there are regulations that require officers to officially inform
their supervisor or receive the supervisor's approval if they testify for
a criminal defendant or a civil rights plaintiff; conversely, no such re-
quirement exists when testifying for the prosecution or in defense of
fellow officers at a civil rights trial. Sometimes, a court or jury will
have recognized the existence of the code within the department. 31
Proof of the code is not only relevant to the policy allegations but also
gives the plaintiff a context in which to place and forcefully argue the
lies and cover-up that underpin the police officer's defense in the case
at bar.
PRIOR POLICE MISCONDUCT
The defendant police officer's background can often be an impor-
tant aspect of the proof. If there were prior recorded instances of
brutality or misconduct and complaints were filed by the victims, the
complaint and the records of any investigations generated by those
cases should be obtained (if they have not been destroyed), and ana-
lyzed for patterns and/or similarities in the weapon used, modus oper-
andi, and explanations offered in defense. Most likely, the vast
majority of the prior complaints will have been classified as "not sus-
tained," and some independent investigation of these cases should be
done to determine whether it can be shown that one or more of the
prior "not sustained" complaints were in fact meritorious. If so, this
proof demonstrates notice, is directly relevant to establishing the fail-
ure to discipline policy itself, and strengthens the affirmative or causa-
tive link between the policy and the officer's conduct in the case at
bar. Any prior complaints that have been "sustained" more directly
show notice to the municipality of the officer's propensity for miscon-
duct, while the ultimate punishment imposed may be disproportion-
ately lenient as to have the same practical effect as a "not sustained"
finding.
31. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988) (revealing officer's
practice of "retaining records in clandestine files deliberately concealed from prosecutors and
defense counsel"); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1393 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that excessive
uses of force were not punished because of an effective "code of silence" within the department);
United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505, 521 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[I]t was admitted here from the
witness stand, that there is a code of silence, and that most policeman observe it."); Thomas v.
City of New Orleans, 687 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that the jury found a "code of
silence" existed which violated the plaintiff's rights).
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Additionally, your client or others who live in the community may
know of other unreported incidents of misconduct by the defendant
officers or be aware of the offending defendant's reputation for bru-
tality. The admissibility of such evidence on the discipline claim is
problematic because the municipality can argue that it did not receive
actual notice. However, the evidence would be relevant if there had
been police intimidation of the victim, or to show the lack of commu-
nity confidence in the disciplinary agency. Also, if the reputation
were widespread, constructive notice could also be argued.
"Repeater beaters," and the disciplinary system's response to them,
can also be a significant area of proof. All departments have repeat-
ers, supervisors know who they are, and complete and accurate disci-
plinary records should also identify them.32 Some of these repeaters
are notorious and have cost the municipality large amounts of money
in judgments and settlements. The department or its disciplinary
agency may keep a repeater file, computerized lists of repeaters, or
have some form of early warning and counseling program. In some
departments this repeater information may be used to develop a pro-
file of a problem officer to identify those officers with such back-
grounds, and to predict future problem officers. The department may
also break down the incidence of brutality in a given police district,
stationhouse, or under a particular supervisor. Reference to federal
court records or inquiry to other lawyers may reveal prior cases. Once
the most egregious repeaters are identified, the failure to discipline
them, despite their misconduct, can often be shown. Additionally, the
procedural and systemic failures in dealing with repeaters-including
the destruction of disciplinary records, the failure to psychologically
counsel or transfer them after a series of complaints, the failure of
supervisors to admit that there is a problem with these officers or to
take any corrective measures, the assignment of such repeaters to elite
units, such as tactical units, their promotion to supervisory positions,
their commendation in incidents where misconduct is alleged, and, in
some instances, the failure to even recognize that "repeaters" are a
problem at all-are all relevant to the issue of discipline. Again, a
police expert's testimony in this area would help to synthesize and
simplify the proof and his opinions would affirmatively buttress its
impact.
32. G. Flint Taylor, Proof of Police Failure to Discipline Cases: A Survey, 3 POLICE MISCON-
DUCT & Civ. RTS. L. REP. 39 (1990) (discussing repeat offenders in police departments through-
out the United States).
[Vol. 48:747
1999] DISCOVERY AND PROOF UNDER MONELL 761
MUNICIPAL DEFENSES TO FAILURE TO DISCIPLINE CLAIMS
The municipal defendant may offer various explanations or de-
fenses to plaintiffs' evidence of a failure to discipline. The low "sus-
tained" rate is sometimes explained by asserting that citizens often
make meritless complaints to retaliate against officers who have legiti-
mately arrested or detained them or to aid alleged "criminals" in their
criminal defenses. While this may be true in a small percentage of
cases, the opposite is more often true-people fail to file complaints
when they have a meritorious case because they mistrust or are intimi-
dated by the police and disciplinary system. The defense may also
assert that organized groups such as street gangs file bogus complaints
for retributive purposes, but the reality is that most street gang mem-
bers are loathe to file complaints, no matter how intense the police
harassment they suffer, in order to avoid confrontations with the po-
lice so they can continue to transact their business. Moreover, demo-
graphic studies have shown that most complainants are not street gang
members or alleged "criminals" accused of serious offenses but rather
are average, predominantly nonwhite, citizens who have a chance en-
counter with the offending officers.
The defendants will attempt to explain the high percentage of "not
sustained" cases by claiming that witnesses and victims will not coop-
erate. Again, in some cases, this is true, more often than not because
of incompetence and intimidation factors. Often the "non-coopera-
tive" witness or victim was never located or contacted because the
investigator was lazy, incompetent, overworked, or was afraid of going
into a "high crime" area to find the witness or to conduct the inter-
view. The lack of subpoena power is also an important reason for this
failure. Again, in the majority of the cases, non-cooperation is not the
reason for the finding; rather, it is the unfair or arbitrary adjudication
of a meritorious case to avoid sustaining the allegations and recom-
mending discipline for the offending officer.
Blame-shifting is also a frequently employed tactic. The discipli-
nary agency often blames insufficient funding and staffing, the lack of
subpoena power, victim and police non-cooperation, as well as the su-
perintendent, the mayor, the city council, the police board, and prior
administrations. The effectiveness of this approach can be minimized,
however, if the disciplinary policy and practice is clearly defined as a
joint and continuing effort by all of these actors, rather than just by
the disciplinary agency, and that together they are responsible for the
shortcomings of the system. However, because the focus of the
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claim-and the main source of deliberate indifference-is the agency,
this may soften the impact of the proof.33
The shifting of the blame to the police union is another tactic uti-
lized by the defense. The union is often responsible for negotiating
terms in the police contract that further weaken the disciplinary appa-
ratus-such as the destruction of "not sustained" disciplinary records
after five years, limitations on the use of "not sustained" findings for
discipline and monitoring even where a pattern is shown, and multi-
tiered procedural guarantees to the accused officers after the agency
finds that the officer violated departmental rules. In rebuttal, it is im-
portant to emphasize that the municipality agreed to these terms and
is therefore equally responsible for them. Moreover, the possibility of
joining the union, as an agent of the police which represents them for
their official "color of law" activities, in Monell claims for their poli-
cies of encouraging police brutality and the code of silence and under-
mining the effectiveness of the disciplinary system should also be
considered.
The municipality may also assert that some cases are later lost at
administrative hearings after the disciplinary agency has "sustained"
the case. In response, it can often be shown by prior admissions or
studies that the municipality's presentation of the cases at hearing was
indifferent or incompetent; furthermore, this does not address the vast
majority of cases that never progress to the hearing stage because the
original finding absolved the officer.
Given recent developments in the law, practitioners may also ex-
pect the municipal defendant to make a strong effort to establish a
lack of deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit has taken the lead
in establishing an onerously high deliberate indifference standard-
one where any remedial effort, no matter how ineffectual or inade-
quate, may suffice to defeat the claim.34 Hence, the defendant will
most likely offer cosmetic changes to the disciplinary agency itself, in-
effectual early warning systems, pro forma counseling sessions by su-
perior officers, and the like as a defense.
33. Ironically, at least according to the Seventh Circuit, the appropriate policymakers, as a
matter of law, may be the Police Board and the City Council, rather than the Police Superinten-
dent and his command personnel. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir.
1993); Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1992). This may necessitate a shift in the
focus of the pleading, proof, and argument with regard to notice and deliberate indifference, to
accommodate this legal fiction.
34. See Wilson, 6 F.3d at 1239-41 (concluding that since the Superintendent of Police properly
referred complaints to the investigating body was sufficient because the plaintiff did not establish
bad faith).
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PROTECTIVE ORDERS
The municipality and the police union will not only aggressively
contest production of much of the relevant policy and practice evi-
dence described above but will also seek highly restrictive protective
orders. Typically, the municipality pursues orders which completely
bar public dissemination of all information obtained from the police
department as well as prevent its dissemination and use in similar
cases. Sometimes, the municipality seeks further restrictions such as
the return of the documents after the case is resolved. Often, the mu-
nicipality attempts to condition production of the files on the plain-
tiff's agreement to these restrictions. Especially in instances where
the material may be important to other cases or contain information
of public importance, such unreasonable restrictions should be re-
sisted. Case law supports the limited dissemination of information to
lawyers in other similar cases as well as the public release of police
disciplinary information of public importance. 35 Additionally, the or-
der can also specifically except statistical information from its purview
and provide a specific procedure for judicially challenging the munici-
pality's designation of specific documents as subject to the secrecy
provisions of the protective order.36
CZAJKOWSKI v. CITY OF CHICAGO. A CASE STUDY
The case of Czajkowski v. City of Chicago37 further illustrates the
strategies and tactics of litigating a Monell failure to discipline claim.
Chicago police officer Ruben Garza, while on duty and with his part-
ner Milan Hrebanek, drove their squad car to a neighboring district
and located his estranged wife, Mary Czajkowski, who was driving
through a park with their six-year-old son.38 Garza put on his Mars
light and curbed Czajkowski.39 After stopping her, and in full view of
his partner, he choked her, gouged her chest with the keys he pulled
35. See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787-89 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that
information should be kept confidential to prevent infliction of pain on parties); Wilk v. Ameri-
can Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that "collateral litigants[s] should
not be permitted to exploit another's discovery ... to obtain access to the sealed information");
Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D. 226 (N.D. Ill. 1997), appeal dismissed, 150 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1998).
36. A thorough treatment of the question of protective orders can be found in the cases of
Triplett v. Shield, 97-C-2775 (N.D. Ill. 1997) and Fallon v. Dillon, 90-C-6722 (N.D. Ill. 1990) and
the orders entered therein by District Judge Milton Shadur. See, for example, the protective
order entered on September 17, 1992 in Fallon, as well as Judge Shadur's oral order of July 31,
1998 in Triplett.
37. 810 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
38. Id. at 1431.
39. Id.
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out of her ignition, and tried to take custody of the child.40 His part-
ner did nothing and later denied that Garza had assaulted Czajkowski
in any way.41 At the time of this assault, Garza was subject to a court
order of protection which forbade him from having contact with
Czajkowski. 42
Czajkowski went to the closest district station to report Garza's as-
sault and battery.43 Charges were drawn, a summons rather than an
arrest warrant was issued, and an internal disciplinary investigation
was initiated by the Office of Professional Standards ("OPS"), the po-
lice agency which investigated police excessive force and domestic vio-
lence cases.44 Czajkowski gave a detailed statement to the OPS in
which she also recounted repeated prior acts of violence against her
by Garza, including one only three weeks before, during which he
beat her and threatened her with his service revolver. 45 She also
stated that Garza had taunted her about reporting his brutality, stating
that all policemen were "brothers" who protect each other and that
the department would do nothing to him.46 The OPS took pictures of
the scratches on Czajkowski's chest, but failed to open investigations
on the prior incidents.47 The OPS then delayed taking the officers'
statements until after the criminal case had been dismissed. Czajkow-
ski, fearing for her safety and that of her son, subsequently dropped
the criminal charges. The OPS then took brief statements from Garza
and his partner during which they did not question Garza about the
prior incidents or his brazen reference to the code of silence and is-
sued a "not sustained" finding. 48
Czajkowski later reinstituted the criminal charges against Garza,
and he was convicted of battery for scratching her with the keys and
was sentenced to supervision. 49 On the basis of his conviction, the
OPS reopened its investigation, "sustained" the scratching allegations,
and Garza received a thirty day suspension.50 Czajkowski and her son
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement of Additional Facts in Response to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment 195, Czajkowski v. City of Chicago (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1993) (No. 89-C-3201)
(on file with DePaul Law Review).
43. Plaintiffs' Complaint 19, Czajkowski v. City of Chicago (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1992) (No. 89-
C-3201) (on file with DePaul Law Review).
44. Id. at 19-23.
45. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement 9 32-33.
46. Id. $1 159; Plaintiffs' Complaint 18.
47. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement 11 33-34; Plaintiffs' Complaint $ 19.
48. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement 919 38-39, 120.
49. Czajkowski v. City of Chicago, 810 F. Supp. 1428, 1431-32 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
50. Id. at 1432-34; Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement 1 46.
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subsequently filed a § 198351 complaint, alleging that Garza and
Hrebanek violated the Fourth Amendment while acting under color
of law when Garza used excessive force and Hrebanek failed to pre-
vent Garza from doing So. 52 Czajkowski also alleged that Garza had
acted pursuant to related de facto municipal policies, practices, and
customs of failing to properly train, discipline, supervise, control, or
counsel police officers, particularly those who engaged in domestic vi-
olence and of encouraging and permitting a police "code of silence"
by which officers protected fellow officers when they were accused of
excessive force and domestic violence.53
MONELL POLICY AND PRAcrICE EVIDENCE
The plaintiffs developed their policy and practice evidence on three
levels: (1) failure to adequately respond to and discipline the defend-
ant's acts of domestic violence; (2) failure to adequately respond to
domestic violence on the department-wide level; and (3) general fail-
ure to adequately respond to, and discipline, the excessive use of
force, including domestic violence. Czajkowski's first level of proof
established that the police department failed to supervise, discipline,
and control Garza despite their knowledge that he was prone to vio-
lence against the plaintiff. It included several prior incidents of vio-
lence against Czajkowski which, although known to the department,
were not investigated and for which Garza was never criminally
charged or disciplined, counseled, supervised or otherwise con-
trolled. 54 As early as six years before the incident, Czajkowski sum-
moned the police to her home after Garza menaced her with his
pistol, attempted to suffocate her, and threatened to kill her, their six-
month-old child, and himself.55 The responding officer and his ser-
geant made no report and talked Czajkowski out of pursuing criminal
and disciplinary charges by reminding her that Garza might lose his
job and, therefore, their source of income. 56 His supervisors were not
contacted, and Garza dismissed the incident as inconsequential. 57 On
two other occasions, Czajkowski called the personnel sergeant in
charge of the department's counseling and monitoring program for
problem officers and reported abusive conduct, but the sergeant told
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
52. Czajkowski, 810 F. Supp. at 1431.
53. Id.
54. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement 1$ 32-34.
55. Id. 11 202-03.
56. Id. 1[ 204-07.
57. Id. 1[ 204, 206.
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her he could do nothing unless Garza volunteered for counseling and
did not bother to document her call.58 On another occasion, Czajkow-
ski reported serious physical abuse to Garza's commanding officer,
who called Garza in and suggested that he see a marriage counselor
but did not initiate disciplinary proceedings.59
Additionally, Garza's superiors showed a marked indifference to his
"domestic problems," claiming not only that they did not know of the
court order of protection which forbade Garza from any contact with
his wife and child but further that the existence of such an order was
none of their business.60 The grossly inadequate OPS investigation
concerning the underlying incident and the original finding of "not
sustained," which were later condemned in deposition testimony by
the head of OPS, the Deputy Superintendent in charge of internal dis-
ciplinary investigations, and the plaintiffs' police discipline expert, also
buttressed this proof. Furthermore, evidence which showed that
Garza continued his abusive conduct towards Czajkowski and her
family after the fact and that his supervisors and the department did
not counsel or monitor him concerning his continuing pattern of do-
mestic violence also reinforced Czajkowski's failure to discipline
evidence. 61
The second aspect of the plaintiff's Monell evidence implicated the
department's general practices and attitudes concerning domestic vio-
lence by police officers. This evidence came from women who worked
in the battered women's network, the director of the OPS, the Deputy
Superintendent in charge of internal disciplinary investigations, the
Superintendent of Police, and supervisory police personnel, including
those who ran the problem employee division.62 The women who
worked in the network established that there was a long standing seri-
ous and continuing problem concerning both domestic violence by po-
lice officers and the police response to domestic violence in general. 63
Specifically, these women established that the department had a pol-
icy of belittling and decriminalizing domestic violence, that they
brought the systemic nature of domestic violence, including that in
police homes, to the attention of police command personnel, and that
they were met with resistance.64 They further asserted that police
wives and girlfriends had more difficulty obtaining police response
58. Id. TT 220-21.
59. Id. 212.
60. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement $$9 184, 186, 198, 212.
61. Id. $$ 194-95.
62. Id. TT 1-230.
63. Id. TT91 -15.
64. Id.
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and protection from battering than did other women, that fellow of-
ficers and their commanders often pressured battered police wives not
to press criminal charges, and that battered police spouses suffered
serious physical and emotional abuse which was exacerbated by their
well-founded fear of seeking help from their abusers' colleagues in the
department. 65
Much of this evidence was corroborated and expanded upon by for-
mer OPS Director David Fogel and Deputy Superintendent Raymond
Risley. 66 Fogel testified that nearly ten percent of the excessive force
complaints investigated each year by the OPS concerned domestic vi-
olence by police officers and further stated that he felt that the depart-
ment's failure to properly arrest and prosecute police officers who
engaged in domestic violence "trivialized" this violence, gave pre-
ferred status to officers vis-A-vis civilians, and "thereby condoned, and
in some circumstances encouraged this conduct." 67 On at least two
occasions, he raised these shortcomings with successive police superin-
tendents and proposed a change in policy, but each time his police
proposal was rejected because he could not "break through the police
culture."' 68 In Fogel's opinion, "the department's response to police
domestic violence was inadequate and no police command officer was
concerned with the issue of domestic violence or did anything to com-
bat it. ' '69
Risley testified that "domestic violence is much more serious in law
enforcement" for the reason that "the officer, who is out of control,
has enormous power because he has a gun, power of arrest and a wide
range of discretionary power."'70 Conversely, he further testified that
a police wife is one of the "least protected members of society."
71
While claiming that the department had improved in the area of po-
lice domestic violence by the late 1980s, he could offer little in support
and admitted that the department's supervisory and disciplinary re-
sponses to domestic violence were still inadequate.
72
Supervisory personnel assigned to monitor and counsel problem
employees admitted that they were woefully understaffed, that they
did not consider domestic violence to be within their purview because
the conduct usually did not happen while the officer was on duty, and
65. Id.
66. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement 20-31, 40, 102-08, 111-19.
67. Id. 1$ 23, 26-27.
68. Id. 11 24-25, 29-30.
69. Id. 1 108.
70. Id. $ 103.
71. Id. 104.
72. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement 105.
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
that counseling was voluntary and seldom utilized. 73 However, while
it was conceded that domestic violence by police officers was a serious
and widespread problem within the department, the testimony, when
taken as a whole, established that the department's program of moni-
toring, counseling, and controlling problem officers systematically
failed to either recognize or address domestic violence within the
department.
The department's deliberate indifference to these problems was fur-
ther graphically demonstrated by the testimony of then police Super-
intendent Martin and several supervisory officers. Martin had
publicly minimized serious domestic violence as "misbehaving" by his
officers.74 He claimed that the department had an "excellent monitor-
ing system for domestic violence" and felt that a police wife was more
protected than civilian victims. 75 While Martin was aware of the alleg-
edly serious and chronic departmental problems with regard to police
domestic violence, as set forth publicly by advocates for battered
women and privately by Fogel and Risley, he rejected the validity of
these assertions and did nothing to further investigate or remedy
them.76 His supervisory officers, like their superintendent, felt that
what officers did at home was their business and that orders of protec-
tion against them for domestic violence were not the concern of the
department. 77
The third level of Monell evidence developed by the plaintiffs estab-
lished the inadequacies of the police disciplinary system with regard to
excessive force and its relationship to discipline in domestic violence
cases. Police statistics showed that the OPS "sustained" only about
five to eight percent of the excessive force complaints lodged each
year and that the percentage was far lower when the officer was a
repeater with numerous excessive force complaints.78 Both Risley
and Fogel conceded in testimony that the OPS should have "sus-
tained" substantially more excessive force cases than it actually did.79
Police audits in 1987 and 1989 corroborated this and found that many
OPS investigations were so inadequate that they gave rise to "[public]
perceptions of incompetence and 'a cover-up' by the Department." 80
Additionally, while supposedly staffed by civilians, many OPS investi-
73. Id. $ 184, 186, 218-19.
74. Id. 116.
75. Id. H 137-38.
76. Id. 11 141-42, 154-55.
77. Id. 140.
78. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement $T 50, 53-54.
79. Id. $1 19-20, 71, 98.
80. Id. 1 92.
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gators were connected to the police, and Fogel admitted that many of
his supervisors and investigators were incompetent. 81 Most signifi-
cantly, in 1987 and again in 1989, Fogel urged the Mayor and the Su-
perintendent to "abolish" or "radically restructure" the OPS because
it "immunizes police from internal discipline," "institutionalizes (po-
lice) lying, subterfuge and injustice," and "serves the needs of the of-
ficer and the [police] union. 82 He proposed an alternative system
which he projected would sustain at least three times as many exces-
sive force complaints as the present system.83 The Superintendent re-
jected his plan and never acted on the major findings and
recommendations of the audits.84 Since the OPS investigated police
domestic violence as well as excessive force cases, Fogel and Risley
admitted that the systemic failures to discipline applied equally to
both.85
CODE OF SILENCE AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
The plaintiffs also developed evidence concerning the code of si-
lence. Fogel testified that the police code of silence "is a conspiracy
against the public" which is more often observed by partners, while in
police domestic violence cases, the code is implemented to protect the
department by minimizing and trivializing the complaint.86 He elabo-
rated on his memos to the Mayor and Superintendent by stating that
the disciplinary system "institutionalizes lying because the officer and
his partner always deny the allegations and the repeated 'not sus-
tained' findings make the officer feel immunized from discipline. '87
While Superintendent Martin had previously admitted in public testi-
mony to the existence of a police code of silence, at his deposition he
strove to minimize its significance, while conceding that he had done
nothing to combat it.88 By and large, police rank and file and OPS
investigators denied knowledge of the code, but one supervisory ser-
geant candidly revealed that he was blackballed for turning another
officer in, that another officer was beaten for breaking the code, and
that he advised his officers not to admit to misconduct. 89 Finally, the
code of silence was graphically demonstrated by Garza's brazen con-
81. Id. 11 17, 69.
82. Id. T9 68, 72-73.
83. Id. TT 70-71.
84. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement J$ 74, 79, 83, 94.
85. Id. 91 31.
86. Id. 1 40.
87. Id. $ 80.
88. Id. 1 160.
89. Id. 11 190-91.
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duct, his subsequent assertions that he was immune from discipline,
his partner's unflinching support for his story, and the fact that neither
was ever disciplined for making a false statement even after the
court's finding of guilt and the department's imposition of discipline. 90
Finally, plaintiff's police expert, Lou Reiter, examined much of the
voluminous policy and practice evidence in the case and testified to
several opinions, including: (1) that the department had a policy, prac-
tice, and custom of failing to supervise, discipline, and counsel officers
who use excessive force; (2) that the department had a code of silence
which was "very institutionalized" and which the department, includ-
ing Martin and Fogel, "failed to address in a reasonable manner;" (3)
that the department had "inadequate officer control in the area of do-
mestic violence" and that their discipline for domestic violence was
also inadequate; and (4) that their customs and practices regarding
discipline, control, and counseling encourage domestic violence. 91
Additionally, he concluded that these policies and practices caused:
(1) Garza to batter Czajkowski because he "felt comfortable that he
would not be held accountable, and if investigated, the allegations
would end up being not sustained;" (2) that Garza's partner should
have intervened to stop Garza's illegal actions; and (3) that his part-
ner's subsequent conduct was "typical" of the code of silence.92
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION
After the close of discovery, the City of Chicago, Police Superinten-
dent Martin, and OPS Director Fogel moved for summary judgment
on the plaintiffs' Monell claims. 93 Relying on the evidence presented
by plaintiffs, the court denied the City's motions, finding that:
Plaintiffs have presented evidence from which it could be found that
the Department's disciplinary procedures, as implemented through
O.P.S., had been woefully inadequate and had sustained only a frac-
tion of meritorious cases of excessive force and domestic violence.
That such improper conduct was unlikely to result in disciplinary
conduct was known throughout the Department, including by the
Department Superintendent and the Director of O.P.S. It was also
known in the Department that there was a serious problem of do-
mestic violence against wives of police officers. Plaintiffs present
sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that police officers
would have understood that excessive force and domestic violence
would not necessarily be punished. Plaintiffs also present sufficient
90. Plaintiffs' 12(n) Statement 47-48.
91. Id. $1 172-73, 175-76.
92. Id. 9 177.
93. Czajkowski v. City of Chicago, 810 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
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evidence from which it could be found that a code of silence existed
within the Department. 94
The court further found that the evidence was also sufficient to sup-
port a finding of deliberate indifference and that the jury could rea-
sonably find a causal link between these practices and the defendants'
unconstitutional conduct:
Garza would have known that he was unlikely to be punished and
that he therefore was more free to commit the conduct alleged by
plaintiffs. It could also be found that these customs contributed to
Hrebanek's failure to intervene during the June 1988 incident. Ad-
ditionally, Czajkowski reported Garza's prior abusive conduct to
various members of the Department prior to the June 1988 incident.
It could be found that the failure to take further action in response
to these reports was the result of the custom of not disciplining of-
ficers who commit domestic violence and that failure of the Depart-
ment to take further action in response to Czajkowski's complaints
contributed to plaintiffs' injuries. 95
Finally, the Court denied Martin and Fogel's motion:
[T]here is evidence to support the existence of Department prac-
tices of failing to discipline and a code of silence, as well as Superin-
tendent Martin's and Director Fogel's knowledge of those practices.
There is sufficient evidence from which Martin and Fogel's personal
responsibility and deliberate indifference can be inferred. Also,
these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. It was
clearly established prior to 1988 that liability for individual officer's
acts of excessive force could be based on a custom or practice of
failing to discipline. It was also clearly established that responsible
supervisors could be individually liable for deliberate indifference to
systemic deficiencies. 96
The case was set for trial and the judge convened a series of pretrial
conferences. During these conferences, the court made preliminary
rulings on documents and witnesses. While narrowing plaintiffs' policy
and practice proof somewhat to focus more on the domestic violence
aspect of the claim, the court made it clear that he would give plain-
tiffs' police expert broad latitude under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence 97 to testify about a wide range of policy evidence which it
did not deem to be otherwise admissible. On the eve of trial, the case
was settled. Subsequently, the City made some positive changes in its
policies and practices with regard to combating domestic violence by
police officers.
94. Id. at 1439-40.
95. Id. at 1440.
96. Id. at 1441 (citations omitted).
97. FED. R. EvID. 703.
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CONCLUSION
Monell claims serve an important role in police misconduct cases.
Beyond the strategic and tactical benefits which are discussed above, a
judiciously employed policy and practice claim serves to enable a pri-
vate practitioner to discharge his obligation as a "private attorney
general" under § 198398 by more effectively deterring police abuse,
positively affecting police policies and practices, and educating the
public about police misconduct. So long as there continues to be a de
facto prohibition against injunctive relief in police abuse cases99 and
state and local agencies fail to adequately prosecute or obtain sys-
temic relief for police abuse, Monell claims by private litigators will
continue to serve an important public interest and should be utilized
in appropriate police misconduct cases.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
99. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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